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* Bank of Italy, Economics, Research and International Relations. 1 Introduction1
This work aims at a better understanding of delegation and favoritism in organizations by ana-
lyzing of the incentives created by competition to in￿ uence decision-making. This paper argues
that the choice between delegating decision powers as opposed to relying on communication of
information from multiple experts is crucially shaped by the incentives created by competition for
in￿ uence. Results are based on the analysis of the e⁄ects of competition in a dynamic game of
information transmission where senders (experts) who have a con￿ ict of interest with the decision
maker are motivated by reputational concerns to report information truthfully. The novel theo-
retical feature of this paper is that it introduces multiple senders in this framework and identi￿es
con￿ icting forces generated by competition among senders. Firstly, competition for in￿ uence in-
duces a reduced in￿ uence e⁄ect: biased senders have fewer chances to in￿ uence decision-making
both in the current period and in the future. Reduced future in￿ uence decreases biased senders￿
incentives to maintain an untarnished reputation as the presence of competitors makes it less likely
that a sender who behaves in the present will be able to cash in the bene￿ts of her undamaged
reputation. Lower current in￿ uence reduces a biased sender￿ s opportunity to mislead the decision
maker in the current period and increases her incentives to report information truthfully. Com-
petition also generates a lost reputation e⁄ect which can raise truthtelling incentives: a sender
fears other senders gaining more in￿ uence as her own reputation falters when other senders have
preferences that do not match with his own. Finally, competition allows the decision maker to
aggregate more information and this may enable, in some circumstances, the decision maker to
distinguish correct reports from wrong reports. The balance between these e⁄ects is ambiguous
and facing multiple senders is not always bene￿cial for the receiver. This result has important
implications for organizational design. Organizations can decide to let agents compete to in￿ u-
ence decision-making, thus aggregating all the available information. When the reduced future
in￿ uence e⁄ect is very strong, however, organizations might ￿nd it optimal to commit to delegate
decision powers to only one sender. The model shows that experts might be delegated decision
powers on certain tasks in order to limit competition for in￿ uence and spur truthtelling incentives.
The model also shows that it can be optimal to commit to bias the competition for in￿ uence as
favouring one of the experts helps create additional incentives to report information truthfully.
Although favoritism characterizes the everyday life of many organizations, it has received little
attention in formal economic analysis and this work shows it could arise as a rational organiza-
tional response to the problem of fostering truthtelling incentives. Finally, the model shows that
di⁄erent organizational forms are preferred as a function of the importance of the decision at
1I am grateful to my supervisors Antoine Faure-Grimaud and Hyun Shin for their helpful guidance. Thanks also
to Gilat Levy, Rocco Macchiavello, Marco Ottaviani, Michele Piccione, Joel Sobel, Dimitri Vayanos and seminar
participants at LSE, EIEF, Universit￿ di Modena e Reggio Emilia, the Econometric Society World Congress 2005,
the European Economic Association Annual Meeting 2005 and the Econometric Society European Winter Meeting
2006 for their helpful comments. All remaining errors are mine.
3stake.
Results can be applied to describe many real world situations in which a decision maker
relies on the information provided by experts who may have a vested interest in inducing certain
decisions. A major application is the analysis of resource allocation within a ￿rm: the chief
￿nancial o¢ cer, CFO (the decision maker), is allocating funds among projects in a ￿rm and
wants to elicit information about them from project leaders (experts) in order to allocate funds
to the most promising project. However, project leaders may derive a private bene￿t if more
funds are allocated to a speci￿c project. This paper shows how the incentives of project leaders
to report the truth change if the CFO collects information from all competing projects leaders
and centralizes the decision as opposed to delegating decisions to one project leader. The results
of the paper can be applied to describe other economic interactions of interest such as politicians
competing to be elected, lobbies attempting to in￿ uence politicians, ￿nancial analysts providing
information to investors and investment banks advising corporate clients.
1.1 Related literature
This paper is based on the literature investigating the transmission of information from possibly
biased experts, in particular the contributions of Sobel (1985) and of Benabou and Laroque
(1992). They derive conditions ensuring that reputational incentives are e⁄ective in inducing
biased experts to report their information truthfully. The main di⁄erence is that this paper
introduces a second informed sender (and analyzes the extension to n senders), so that truthtelling
incentives are created both by the desire to keep a reputation and by the competition for in￿ uence.
Moreover, it di⁄ers in the way the bias of senders is modelled: in both Sobel and Benabou and
Laroque a biased sender always has a con￿ ict of interest with the decision maker, while in this
model senders always prefer a given decision which might coincide with the preferences of the
decision maker depending on the realization of the state of the world. This can be a more
interesting way to model the preferences of experts in many applications.
Horner (2002) is also relevant as he shows how reputation and competition interact to create
incentives for the producers of a good. Competition has the role of enforcing the production of
high quality goods because it creates an outside option for consumers as they will switch to a
di⁄erent producer upon receiving a low quality good. A critical di⁄erence is that Horner deals with
an environment where monetary transfers are not allowed. More importantly, he does not discuss
the implications of the interactions of reputational incentives and competition on organizational
design.
The rationale for delegating authority is investigated by a broad and varied economic litera-
ture, with Aghion and Tirole (1997) being among the most important contributions. However,
few papers deal with settings without transfers. Dessein (2002) is the ￿rst to discuss delegation
in a cheap talk setting. He evaluates the use of delegation as opposed to communication in a
4model ￿ la Crawford and Sobel (1982), where the sender￿ s bias is public knowledge. Delegation
is shown to improve upon communication as the latter involves a garbling of information due
to the sender￿ s bias. This work di⁄ers as it deals with a setting where multiple senders trans-
mit information and their bias is unknown. Results are also di⁄erent. Communication (letting
senders compete for in￿ uence) can be preferable to delegation, depending on the importance of
the decision.2 Moreover, a combination of communication and delegation can improve upon both
pure communication and pure delegation. This seems to be a broader view of organizational life,
as delegation and communication coexists in practice and the choice between the two is often
dictated by the importance of the decision at hand.
This paper is also related to some contributions investigating the optimal design of delegation
as a way to promote information transmission, Alonso and Matouschek (2007 - I and 2007 - II)
and Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (2004). The latter is especially relevant as they investigate the
e⁄ect of transferring control in situations where an expert is motivated by reputational concerns.
Melumad and Shibano (1991) and Szalay (2005) also provide related results. They investigate
whether the decision maker can improve information transmission by committing to follow certain
decision rules. All these papers, however, do not deal with competition and rather focus on the
role of the alignment of incentives between the sender and the decision maker.
This paper also explores the literature on favoritism. Only a few papers in economics deal
with this issue. The ￿rst is Prendergast and Topel (1996) who show that allowing managers to
reward their favorite employees might be a cheap way of providing incentives. However the authors
assume that managers utility is increasing if their subordinates get promoted. This assumption
is key to generate a role for favoritism. Another is Kwon (2006) who generates endogenously a
preference for favoritism in a model where inventors compete to have their project implemented
and the decision maker designs an optimal incentive scheme. However, he deals with a model where
inventors become informed after exerting costly e⁄ort and the e⁄ects generated by competition
are rather di⁄erent.3
This work is related to the literature on in￿ uence activities. Milgrom and Roberts (1988)
represents an early important contribution in the area. They show that employees might want to
allocate e⁄ort to produce information about their ability. Such information is valuable for the ￿rm,
but comes at the cost of subtracting e⁄ort away from other productive activities. Milgrom and
Roberts discuss organizational responses to the presence of excessive in￿ uence activities. My model
shares the view that organizational form is an instrument that can be employed to improve the
transmission of relevant information. However, in￿ uence activities are modelled rather di⁄erently
and this literature has paid little attention to the explicit analysis of the e⁄ects of competition in
2And independently of the bias of the experts which is unknown.
3In Kwon (2006) the assumptions about e⁄ort costs are key in delivering the result that symmetric e⁄ort
(induced by ￿fairness￿ ) improves upon favoritism.
5inducing the correct transmission of information.4
Finally, this work draws on the literature on cheap talk games. Following the seminal contri-
bution of Crawford and Sobel (1982), a large literature developed focussing on di⁄erent variations
on the theme, taking both a purely theoretical and an applied perspective. Among these con-
tributions, Gilligan and Krehbiel (1989) and Krishna and Morgan (2001) are the closest as they
investigate the e⁄ect of the presence of two senders. However, they do not investigate situa-
tions where the bias of senders is not perfectly known and agents are motivated by reputational
concerns.
The paper is structured as follows: section 2 describes the model, section 3 derives the equi-
librium when the decision maker cannot commit to delegate decision powers and compares the
one and the two senders case, section 4 discusses the role of delegating authority to one of the
senders and why favoritism can be optimal, section 5 analyses the welfare of the decision maker,
section 6 shows when it can be optimal to delegate decision powers to an agent with a less estab-
lished reputation, section 7 extends the model to the case of n senders competing to in￿ uence the
decision maker, section 8 contains a discussion of the assumptions, the modelling strategy, and
applications, section 9 concludes.
2 The model
The strategic interaction between the decision maker (DM, she) and senders (he) is modelled as
a two period game. The same stage game is repeated in each period.
Information structure: At the beginning of the ￿rst period nature draws the types of
senders. They might be honest (unbiased), left-biased or right-biased. A sender￿ s type is his
private information, is constant over time, and is distributed according to the probability distri-
bution Pr(i = Honest) = pi; Pr(i =left-biased) = Pr(i =right-biased) =
1￿pi
2 . Firstly, both
senders will be assumed to have the same ex-ante chance of being honest. In such a case,
Pr(i = H) = Pr(￿i = H) = p:
Every period, nature draws a random variable y 2 fL;C;Rg representing the state of the
world. State realizations across periods are independent. States L and R are equally likely and
occur with probability ￿ < 1
2; state C; has prior probability 1￿2￿:5 The parameter ￿ can represent
the inverse of the degree of con￿ ict of interest with the decision maker. In fact, the smaller ￿;
the less likely the state preferred by biased senders, thus the stronger the con￿ ict of interest.
States of the world in di⁄erent periods are drawn independently. Senders privately observe a
4Rotemberg and Saloner (1995) is also broadly related as the authors show that con￿ ict between members of
an organization can foster information production. The bad side of con￿ ict is that producing information is costly,
and too much con￿ ict can lead to excessive e⁄ort being devoted to information production.
5This also includes the case in which all states of the world are equally likely (￿ = 1
3):
6signal that perfectly reveals the realization of the state of the world. Moreover, nature draws a
random variable that de￿nes period importance. This is represented by the random variable A
with support ￿ = [A;A];A > 0; and distributed according to a continuous distribution function
G(￿) for the decision maker, and by the random variable B; with support ￿ = [B;B]; B > 0 and
distributed according to the continuous distribution function H(￿); for senders. The distribution
H is atomless. The realization of period importance is common knowledge and observed before
messages are sent and decisions made. Finally, decision maker￿ s payo⁄ is commonly observed,
while each sender￿ s payo⁄ is his private information.6
Players and actions: The decision maker interacts with one or two senders. In each
period the decision maker implements a decision d 2 fL;C;Rg. Senders provide a message
m 2 fL;C;Rg; suggesting the appropriate course of action. After observing the messages, the
decision maker decides what action to implement.
Player￿ s payo⁄s: The decision maker wishes to implement the decision that matches the
state of the world. Formally, UDM = A if d = y and UDM = ￿A if d 6= y7. Honest senders have
the same preferences over actions as the decision maker, so that UH = B if d = y; and UH = ￿B
otherwise. On the contrary, left-biased senders always prefer decision L to be implemented, so
that UL = B if d = L and UL = ￿B if d 6= L: Analogously right-biased senders always prefer
decision R to be implemented, so that UR = B if d = R and UR = ￿B if d 6= R: Notice that
this implies biased types su⁄er the same ￿damage￿if their preferred decision is not implemented,
independently of the ￿distance￿of the decision from their preference. In fact, a left-biased sender
incurs a loss of ￿B both if decision C is made and if decision R is made8. I am also assuming the
decision maker cannot adjust the intensity of the action as a function of the reputation of each
sender nor as a function of the magnitude of the ￿consensus￿ : the decision maker might want to
trust more the information provided by senders if they report the same information, and less if
they don￿ t. This possibility is explored further in the paper when I extend the model to allow for
the presence of more than two senders. Finally, I am assuming there is no type biased towards
state C. This is both interesting in itself, as it allows to explore the e⁄ect of having a decision
that is ￿unbiased￿ 9, and useful to keep the model tractable.
Contracts: this model aims at describing an environment where it is di¢ cult to write complete
contracts to govern agents￿interactions. Senders￿private signals are not veri￿able to court, and
money cannot be transferred among players. The main contractible variable is the power to
in￿ uence decision-making. In the ￿rst part of the paper, it will be assumed that the decision
6This assumption is needed to avoid perfect revelation of a sender￿ s type when payo⁄s are realized. However,
decision maker￿ s payo⁄s could be assumed to be unobservable without altering any of the results.
7The subscripts DM;H;L;R denote, respectively, the payo⁄ functions of Decision Maker, Honest, Left biased
and Right biased.
8It could be the case that left biased senders prefer decision C over decision R and right biased senders prefer
decision C over decision L: Allowing for this possibility adds little to the economic intuition.
9I mean a decision which is not preferred by any biased type.
7maker is not able to credibly commit to delegate decision powers to a sender. This assumption
will be removed in the section on delegation and favoritism.
Timing: there are two periods. At the beginning of the ￿rst period, senders￿types are drawn
and privately observed by each sender only.10 Then the state variable is drawn and privately
observed by senders only. The period importance realization for decision maker and senders is
drawn and commonly observed.11 Senders simultaneously report messages, the decision maker
chooses a course of action, possibly on the basis of senders reports, payo⁄s are realized, and the
decision maker updates her beliefs about senders￿type. The same stage game is repeated in the
second period, with the exception that senders￿types are still the same as in the ￿rst period.
Strategies and beliefs: for ease of exposition it is assumed that honest senders are committed
types and always report information truthfully.12 Therefore, attention should be placed on biased
senders. left-biased sender i reports the state realization truthfully in period t with probability
qs
i;t(ht), where s represents the true realization of the state of the world and ht is the history of the
game at the beginning of date t. Analogously, right-biased senders report information truthfully
with probability zs
i;t(ht): The dependence on the state of the world follows because the true state
can coincide with the preferred decision for the sender, and this a⁄ects the willingness to report
the state truthfully. The decision maker updates her beliefs about sender i type through Bayes










if m = y (report was truthful)
pi;2 = 0 if m 6= y (report was false)
Strategies for the decision maker are mappings from the set fm1;m2g ￿ fi;￿ig to the set of
actions. In words, the decision maker chooses decision d; when sender i reported message mi;
and sender ￿i reported message m￿i in period t; with probability ￿d;i;mi;m￿i(ht) 2 [0;1]; where
again ht is the history of the game at the beginning of date t: Such probabilities depend upon the
credibility of the sender￿ s report and upon the messages sent.
3 Communication
In this section it is assumed that the decision maker cannot commit to grant decision powers to
a given sender. Senders communicate their information to the decision maker who chooses the
10Sender i knows his type, but not sender ￿i￿ s type.
11There is no loss of generality in assuming that the decision maker observes her own period importance real-
ization and senders observe theirs. However, to decide whether delegation or favouritism are better than commu-
nication, the decision maker should be able to get at least an informative signal about the realization of period
importance for the senders. This point will be discussed further later on.
12This is with little loss of generality. Without that assumption, there could exist babbling equilibria in which
the decision maker discards all information transmitted and senders randomize among messages. It is important
to stress that all the equilibria derived under the assumption that honest senders always report the truth are still
equilibria when that assumption is removed.
8appropriate course of action.
The equilibrium concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. I limit attention to strategies based
upon current history. An equilibrium is a set of strategies qs
i;t(ht); zs
i;t(ht) for left and right-biased
senders and ￿d;i;mi;m￿i(ht) for the decision maker, as de￿ned above, and a set of beliefs fp;pi;2g
for the decision maker, so that strategies are sequentially rational for a given set of beliefs and
beliefs are consistent given the strategy pro￿le. For ease of notation I will drop the dependence
of q; z and ￿ on ht and that of p2 on i:
The analysis is centered on truthtelling equilibria, i.e. equilibria in which biased senders report
information when they have incentives to do so, and the decision maker ￿nds it optimal to use
the information provided by senders.13 The goal is to identify conditions such that truthtelling
equilibria exist. Information transmission can take place as long as the probability senders are
honest (￿sender￿ s credibility￿ ) is large enough. When the credibility of a sender is too low, the
decision maker discards the messages received and biased senders randomize.
In order to simplify the analysis, I assume that ￿ > 1
3 (but ￿ < 1
2): This ensures the decision
maker prefers to randomize between actions L and R when uninformed.14
It is useful to state four preliminary results, common to the one and two senders games.
Lemma 1 In a truthtelling equilibrium: 1. A biased sender always suggests his preferred decision
to be implemented in the last period if he has enough credibility to transmit information. 2. A
biased sender always reports the truth when the state of the world coincides with his preferences
and he has enough credibility to transmit information. 3. The decision maker prefers to randomize
between action L and R when uninformed. 4. The decision maker is willing to implement the
decision proposed by the sender with positive probability in period 2 if and only if p2 > 1￿2￿
2(1￿￿):
Proof. See the appendix.
Notice that, as the degree of con￿ ict of interest is reduced, i.e. ￿ is larger, prior reputation
necessary for information transmission to occur, gets smaller.
Firstly, I will analyze the game where one sender tries to in￿ uence the decision maker, then
I will turn to the two senders game. I describe the behavior of a left-biased sender, as that of a
right-biased sender is analogous.
One sender. In order to analyze an interesting problem, I assume throughout that the prior
probability the sender is unbiased is larger than 1￿2￿
2(1￿￿): This is a necessary condition for the
13There can also exists ￿partial babbling equilibria￿in which the decision maker only listens to one sender and
discards the messages of the other who randomizes among messages. Such situation would be similar to that
analyzed when discussing delegation.
14Without this assumption results are qualitatively unchanged, and some of them even stronger, as will be
underlined in due course. An interpretation of this assumption, in the example of resources allocation within a
￿rm, is that state C corresponds to ￿discard all projects￿ . (this does not provide private bene￿ts to any biased
project leader). However, ex ante, it is more likely that undertaking either project L or project R is more likely
than ￿discard all projects￿ .
9existence of a truthtelling equilibrium in pure strategies. In the second period a left-biased sender
always reports that the true state is L; which implies qL
2 = 1 if the state is L and qC
2 = qR
2 = 0;
otherwise. In the ￿rst period a left-biased sender trades o⁄ current gains with the possibility of
in￿ uencing the decision in the future. If the true state is L; the sender reports the truth for sure,
as this involves no reputational loss. If instead the true state is either zero or R; the payo⁄ of a
left-biased sender by reporting the truth in period 1 is
VT = ￿B + ￿E(B)
where ￿ 2 (0;1] is a discount factor and E(￿) denotes the expectation operator, so that E(B) =
R
￿ BdH(B): The payo⁄ from lying is given by
VL = B
This follows because if a sender lies in the ￿rst period, his second period reputation is destroyed as
the posterior probability he is honest is p2 = 0: Therefore the decision maker will not listen to the
sender in the second period, and will make an uninformed decision which yields an expected payo⁄
of zero. As the sender is not believed because his reputation is gone, a biased sender without
reputation randomizes among messages: Under the assumption that p > 1￿2￿
2(1￿￿); it is possible to
prove the following
Proposition 1 In the one sender case, a biased sender reports information truthfully in pure
strategies in the ￿rst period if: 1. The true state coincides with her preferences. 2. The true




: When the true state does not coincide with her preference, a biased
sender can report information truthfully in mixed strategies, in the ￿rst period, but this is a zero
probability event.
Proof. See the appendix.
The intuition for this result is standard and is analogous to that in Sobel (1985): if the
realization of decision importance in the ￿rst period is not too high, a biased sender is willing to
incur a current loss in order to be able to in￿ uence the decision maker in the second period.
I now move to the analysis of the game where two senders report information and show the
e⁄ects of competition on truthtelling incentives.
Two senders. It is useful to state two preliminary results.
Lemma 2 In a truthtelling equilibrium: 1. The decision maker always uses the information
provided by senders if they have enough credibility. 2. There is always truthtelling in the ￿rst
period if the true state is C.
10Proof. See the appendix.
The ￿rst part says that the decision maker never bene￿ts from discarding information when
senders have enough credibility to ensure information transmission takes place. Formally, this
implies that, when senders have enough credibility, the chosen decision d coincides either with
mi; or with m￿i: Thus, I drop the dependence of ￿ on d; and the lemma also implies that
￿i;mi;m￿i + ￿￿i;mi;m￿i = 1: The second part follows because C is the ￿unbiased￿ action. In a
truthtelling equilibrium, the opponent reports the truth. When the true state is C, the decision
maker observes a message suggesting state C from the opponent. Then, there is no pro￿table
deviation because the decision maker knows that C is not the preferred action of any biased type
and it must be the true state.
The e⁄ects of competition on truthtelling incentives can be illustrated by examining the be-
havior of a biased sender when the observed state does not coincide with his preferences and there
is a con￿ ict of interest with the decision maker: I assume the sender is left-biased and the true
state is R:15 Biased senders always lie in the last period.16 The payo⁄ of a left-biased sender i; in























































if he reports truthfully in the ￿rst period, and
V
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+ p(￿ ￿ (1 ￿ 2￿) ￿ ￿)]
if he lies.17
15The case of a right biased sender observing the true state is L is identical.
16Therefore, the probability a left biased sender i reports the truth in period 1 when the true state is R; is
denoted as qR
i dropping the reference to the time period.
17The intuition for these expressions can be described as follows: when the left-biased sender reports the truth in
period 1, the decision maker observes two concordant messages if the opponent is unbiased, or is right-biased, or is





￿i]: In this case the decision
maker follows the advice of sender i with probability ￿
i;R;R
1 and that of sender ￿i with probability ￿
￿i;R;R
1 ; where
the superscripts R;R denote the fact that the decision maker is observing two messages suggesting the true state




￿i) the opponent is left-biased and is lying. Then, the decision maker faces two
con￿ icting messages, one suggesting the true state is R coming from sender i; the other suggesting the true state
is L coming from sender ￿i; and she implements the decision suggested by sender i with probability ￿
i;R;L
1 leading
to a loss for that sender (this explains the negative sign), or the decision suggested by sender ￿i with probability
￿
￿i;R;L
1 and this bene￿ts a left-biased sender i: The second and the third lines represent expected continuation
11By examining payo⁄s, it can be seen that the presence of a second sender generates two e⁄ects.
There is a reduced in￿ uence e⁄ect both in the current period and in the future. Reduced future
in￿ uence implies that a biased sender who maintains his reputation, will not be able to in￿ uence
the decision maker for sure in the second period. So it is less important to be trusted and this
reduces incentives for building a reputation for being an honest adviser. This can be seen by
































































On the other hand, reduced current in￿ uence softens the temptation to deplete own reputation
because the sender might not be able to in￿ uence ￿rst period decision either, as the decision
maker follows the advice of sender i with probability ￿i;mi;m￿i ￿ 1: In other words, reduced
current in￿ uence decreases the opportunity cost of keeping own reputation. Therefore reduced
future in￿ uence and reduced current in￿ uence determine opposite e⁄ects on truthtelling incentives.
Competition also has a lost reputation e⁄ect: if a biased sender lets competitors gain in￿ uence,
he expects decisions against his preferences more than half of the times. This is represented by






￿i) ￿ (1 ￿ 2￿)p]￿E(B) < 0
which can be interpreted as the cost of a lost reputation. In any equilibrium with information
transmission, this term is smaller than zero which is the continuation value by lying in the one
sender case18. The balance between the reduced in￿ uence (current and future), and the lost
payo⁄s, while equation 2 represents the payo⁄from lying and all can be understood following the same logic. Both









and on the fact that a right-biased sender reports the truth when the true state is R; setting zR
1 = 1
18Notice that the sign of this e⁄ect depends upon the assumptions about the action preferred by the decision
maker when she is uninformed. Assuming that ￿ > 1
3; implies that the decision maker prefers to randomize
between actions L and R when uninformed, which yields a payo⁄ of zero to biased senders. If instead ￿ < 1
3; the
decision maker would choose action C when uninformed, and the cost of a lost reputation would be larger under
12reputation e⁄ect determines whether competition increases or reduces truthtelling incentives.
In order to characterize the equilibrium with two senders, it is necessary to analyze the be-
havior of the decision maker. Lemma 2 showed that when the decision maker observes a message
suggesting decision C should be implemented and another message suggesting decision L or R;
she knows the true state is C, as no biased sender prefers decision C. However, when the decision
maker observes a message suggesting action L and a message suggesting action R; she cannot ex-
tract any information about the true state of the world. The equilibrium behavior of the decision
maker in such a case is shown in the following:
Lemma 3 1. In equilibrium the decision maker always randomizes between messages when she
observes con￿icting messages L and R from senders with the same reputation. 2. There cannot
exist truthtelling equilibria when the decision maker always follows the advice of a given sender.
Proof. See the appendix
It is now possible to prove the following
Proposition 2 In the ￿rst period, if prior reputation is large enough, p > 1￿2￿
2(1￿￿); there exists
a truthtelling equilibrium in which a biased sender: 1. Reports the truth in pure strategies when
the true state coincides with his preferences. 2. When the true state does not coincide with his
preferences, he reports the truth in pure strategies if the true state is C, otherwise, he reports
information truthfully in pure strategies when the importance of the decision is not too large, in
particular B < ￿E(B)[1
2 ￿ p(1
2 ￿ ￿)] ￿ B￿
2 , he reports information truthfully in mixed strategies,
with probability q￿ =
2[￿E(B)(1￿(1￿￿)p)￿B]




2 ￿ ￿)] < B < ￿E(B)[1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)p] ￿ Bmix
2 . If prior reputation is
￿intermediate￿ , 1￿2￿
3￿2￿ < p < 1￿2￿
2(1￿￿) there can only be truthtelling in mixed strategies with probability
q￿ as long as B￿
2 < B < Bmix
2 : Truthtelling incentives decrease as the bias gets stronger.
Proof. See the appendix
The intuition is analogous to that of the one sender game: if period importance is low enough, it
pays to give up current period payo⁄s to retain in￿ uence on future decisions. If period importance
is larger, it is optimal to report information truthfully only at times. Finally, if period importance
is very high, it is optimal to in￿ uence the decision maker in the current period as the stakes are
high and it is unlikely that future decisions will be even more important.
The discussion so far makes it possible to investigate whether competition fosters truthtelling
incentives. The following proposition summarizes one of the main results of the paper.
Proposition 3 Competition has ambiguous e⁄ects on truthtelling incentives.
no competition. When ￿ = 1
3; she is indi⁄erent among the three states.
13Proof. See the appendix
If the true state is C, competition has a bene￿cial e⁄ect as aggregating information ensures
the decision maker learns about the true state of the world. If instead the true state of the world
does not coincide with the ￿unbiased state￿ , the proposition shows that when there is truthtelling
in pure strategies under competition there always is truthtelling in pure strategies with one sender
only, and if the probability senders are honest is large enough, there are levels of period importance
such that there is no truthtelling under competition (not even in mixed strategies) and truthtelling
in pure strategies with one sender. Therefore, competition for in￿ uence can reduce the incentives
of biased senders to report the truth. Truthtelling incentives are greatest if a sender is certain
that his e⁄ort to gain in￿ uence on future decisions will not be jeopardized by the analogous e⁄ort
of another player. However the fear the other sender will gain in￿ uence on future decisions and
turns these against own preferences generates incentives to preserve credibility to in￿ uence future
decisions. Moreover, the presence of a second sender reduces the value of a current deviation and
this softens the temptation to give up reputation to enjoy current payo⁄. The balance among
these e⁄ects determines whether competition raises truthtelling incentives.
4 Delegating authority - delegation and favoritism
Previous discussion made clear how the interplay of two forces (reduced current and future in-
￿ uence, and lost reputation e⁄ect) shapes truthtelling incentives when the decision maker cannot
commit to follow the advice of a speci￿c sender. This section investigates whether organizational
design can be used to improve matters for the decision maker. In particular, delegating decision-
making powers to a sender could be one way of retaining the lost reputation e⁄ect while softening
reduced future in￿ uence. In order to achieve this, the decision maker needs to be able to commit
to implement the decision proposed by one sender. A way to reach a credible commitment is
to delegate authority to make decisions. decision-making powers can be awarded to a sender for
as long as he maintains his reputation. When the latter is depleted the agent is ￿red and an-
other agent gets the authority to decide in the second period. Intuitively this might be bene￿cial
because it eliminates the reduced future in￿ uence e⁄ect and raises incentives for maintaining a
reputation in the future. However, this policy increases the gains from a deviation in the current
period. I consider two possibilities. The ￿rst is ￿delegation￿ , the second is ￿favoritism￿ . Dele-
gation implies that ￿i
1 = 1; ￿
￿i
1 = 0; under the assumption that pi = p￿i = p > 1￿2￿
2(1￿￿); so that
player i denotes the in￿ uential sender. If he does not lie in the ￿rst period, ￿i
2 = 1;￿
￿i
2 = 0; and
the opposite otherwise. Favoritism allows for the possibility that the decision maker commits to
follow the advice of sender i with a given probability ￿i
1 < 1 in the ￿rst period, and to delegate
decision-making to one of the senders in the last period, so as to preserve future in￿ uence. This
can be regarded as a form of favoritism, as the decision maker biases the competition for in￿ uence
14in favour of one of the senders. According to this de￿nition, delegation can be regarded as a
special form of favoritism.
Notice that in both delegation and favoritism, the strategy of the decision maker is not con-
tingent on the observed messages as the decision of the in￿ uential sender can not be overturned:
the decision maker credibly committed to delegate decision-making powers to that sender. If the
decision maker could overturn the in￿ uential sender decision, the equilibrium would be the same
as in the communication case. An important aspect to stress is what the set of available contracts
is. The only assumptions needed are that the decision maker cannot overturn the decision chosen
by the in￿ uential sender after observing the reports and that senders cannot be ￿ned for a wrong
report. Then contracts can be made contingent on di⁄erent variables. Firstly, a contract could
just state that decisions in the ￿rst period are made by sender i: Then after a correct report in
the ￿rst period, the decision maker is indi⁄erent between letting sender i in￿ uence second period
decision or remove him. Alternatively, contracts can be contingent on the importance of the de-
cision. Then delegation could be implemented by stating that an agent will be delegated powers
(in both the current and the future period) as a function of current period importance: this will
take care of equilibrium behavior of biased senders. Finally, a contract could state that a sender
can fully in￿ uence decisions and if he is ￿red after the ￿rst decision, the principal (the decision
maker) has to pay penalties for breaching the contract. This is self enforcing because the sender
would prefer to ￿re the agent and pay the ￿ne only when the ￿rst decision was wrong.19 This is
very similar to a severance payment system.
I am assuming the decision maker can fully commit not to renegotiate the contract o⁄ered.
However, it is interesting to examine whether such contracts are renegotiation proof. The in￿ u-
ential sender would need a payment of 2B to accept to overturn the decision, so the bene￿t for
the decision maker has to be larger than this quantity. Moreover, the possibility of renegotiation
would reduce incentives for a biased non-in￿ uential sender to report information truthfully: in
fact when reports do not coincide, the biased non-in￿ uential sender might induce the decision
maker to overturn the in￿ uential sender decision. Hence, the decision maker will have to pay 2B




2 z: This might not
be in the interest of the decision maker. In particular, delegation is renegotiation proof if period
importance for the decision maker is perfectly correlated to that for senders.
I start by analyzing whether (full) delegation leads to stronger truthtelling incentives than
communication does. Suppose the sender is left-biased (the right-biased case is analogous). If
the true state is L; he will report the truth. When the true state is either C, or R; a left-biased
sender i reports the truth when delegated authority if and only if:
V
i
T = ￿B + ￿E(B) > V
i
L = B + ￿E(B)[
1 ￿ p
2




19Provided, of course, the ￿ne is not too large.
15which requires:
B <




It is interesting to notice that truthtelling incentives increase as the bias gets stronger. This
follows because the lost reputation e⁄ect gets larger. In fact, if the bias is stronger, (￿ smaller),
it is more costly to jeopardize own reputation as in expected terms, the decision maker will be
in￿ uenced to make a decision against biased sender i in the future period. Notice also that mixed
strategy equilibria here exists only for a set of parameters whose joint occurrence is a measure
zero event. The following proposition shows in what circumstances delegation is optimal.
Proposition 4 When the true state is either L or R, delegating decision powers to one sender
induces stronger truthtelling than letting senders compete for in￿uence
Proof. See the appendix
The proof shows that there are values of period importance such that there is truthtelling in
pure strategies under delegation, while under communication with two senders there is truthtelling
in mixed strategies only. Furthermore, if the probability the opponent is honest is large enough
(p > 1
3￿4￿); there is truthtelling under delegation, while there is not even truthtelling in mixed
strategies under communication with two senders. Delegating decision powers to an agent amounts
to letting the agent in￿ uence the decision both in the ￿rst and in the second period if he does
not jeopardize his reputation. Thus, delegation protects in￿ uence. On the other hand, if the
in￿ uential sender destroys his reputation, he will not have any chance to in￿ uence the decision
maker in the future and newcomers will have full decision powers. In every equilibrium with
information transmission both senders must have a large enough prior reputation. Thus each
sender thinks the opponent is relatively more likely to be honest. Therefore the fear that future
decisions will be in￿ uenced by an agent with opposed interests raises truthtelling incentives.
Hence, the relative bene￿ts and costs of delegation as opposed to communication, are to
be identi￿ed along two dimensions. Delegation protects in￿ uence while maintaining discipline.
The dark side of delegation is obvious: ￿rstly, under competition, the decision maker is certain
to implement the correct action, whenever the true state requires coincides with the unbiased
action; secondly, the in￿ uential sender has unfettered ability to implement his preferred action in
the current period.
A way to overcome the latter problem is to delegate power with probability less than one in
the ￿rst period. This is what I de￿ne as ￿favoritism￿ . Then, assume, without loss of generality,
that sender i is delegated decision powers in the second period, provided he reports information
truthfully in the ￿rst period. Call sender i the ￿in￿ uential sender￿ . The policy consists in o⁄er-
ing the in￿ uential sender the following contract: the decision he proposes is implemented with
probability 1
2 < ￿i
1 < 1 in the ￿rst period. The probability ￿i
1 can be regarded as the degree of
favoritism and as ￿i
1 is close to one, the degree of favoritism is said to be ￿strong￿ . If the report
16turns out to be correct, the sender gets full decision powers in the second period. Formally ￿i
2 = 1
if mi;1 = yi;1, ￿i
2 = 0 otherwise. It is assumed the decision maker commits to following the advice
of each sender with probability ￿i
1 and ￿
￿i
1 = 1 ￿ ￿i
1, and that the probability senders are honest
is large enough so as to ensure information transmission occurs in equilibrium. Under favoritism
players can behave asymmetrically: in fact, when the in￿ uential sender ￿nds it optimal to report
information truthfully, a biased non-in￿ uential sender prefers to lie in the ￿rst period as he will
not have any chance to in￿ uence second period decision. On the other hand, he might tell the
truth, when the in￿ uential sender is lying, provided that current period importance is not too
large. Thus, it is possible to prove the following
Proposition 5 Favoritism induces stronger truthtelling incentives for the in￿uential sender than
delegation. It induces stronger truthtelling incentives than communication when the true state is
either L or R. When favoritism is strong, a biased non-in￿uential sender chooses to report the
truth for intermediate realizations of period importance.
Proof. See the appendix.
Favoritism allows the decision maker to provide the in￿ uential sender with stronger truthtelling
incentives. On the other hand, the non-in￿ uential sender might lie, and a wrong decision suggested
by the non-in￿ uential sender is implemented with positive probability. When the degree of fa-
voritism is strong20, a biased non-in￿ uential sender reports the truth for intermediate importance
realizations.
5 Decision maker payo⁄
Previous discussion made clear how competition for in￿ uence shapes truthtelling incentives. This
section investigates the conditions ensuring the decision maker prefers communication over dele-
gation.21 This choice depends upon four factors. The ￿rst is truthtelling incentives, the second
is the distribution of period importance for the decision maker, the third is the distribution of
period importance for senders, the fourth is the distribution of the states of the world. In fact,
the more likely the unbiased state, the more communication is likely to lead to a larger payo⁄for
the decision maker. On the other hand, if the unbiased state is more likely, truthtelling incentives
under delegation become stronger.
In order to establish whether decision maker payo⁄ is larger under delegation or under com-
munication, it is crucial to distinguish two cases: in the ￿rst the decision maker chooses whether
to delegate decision powers to one sender or to rely upon communication, after observing ￿rst
20The degree of favouritism is a choice variable of the decision maker who will set ￿i
1 so as to maximize her
expected payo⁄.
21The comparison with favouritism is similar, it just involves more tedious algebra.
17period importance (both for himself and for the senders), but before senders propose a decision;
in the second, the decision maker chooses communication or delegation before observing the re-
alization of ￿rst period importance. The main intuition can be gained from the analysis of the
￿rst case. When the decision maker chooses organizational form after observing the realization
of ￿rst period importance, the optimality of communication as opposed to delegation depends
exclusively upon truthtelling incentives and the distribution of period importance for the decision
maker. Then, it is possible to prove the following
Proposition 6 Communication leads to a larger payo⁄ for the decision maker if period impor-
tance for senders is low. When period importance is intermediate, or high, delegation can be
preferred to communication.
Proof. See the appendix
The ￿rst part of the result refers to the case when there is truthtelling in pure strategies both
under delegation and under communication. In such a case, the latter is preferred. The main
reason is that communication allows to fully exploit the presence of a non biased action and the
con￿ ict of interest between senders with opposed bias. On the contrary, when period importance
is intermediate or high, delegation can be preferred to communication thanks to the stronger
truthtelling incentives it induces.
This analysis underlines that truthtelling incentives can be interpreted as incentives for bi-
ased senders to pool with honest senders. Delegation can increase such incentives, thus delaying
learning about senders￿type. Notice that if the decision maker attaches the same importance to
decisions as senders do, truthtelling occurs for decisions that the decision maker does not regard
as especially important. As truthtelling incentives represent conditions under which biased types
pool with honest, the decision maker learns senders types when it is more costly for him to do so.
Essentially, the decision maker cannot hedge against agency con￿ icts, so that when her period
importance is very positively correlated with that for senders she may prefer to learn as quickly
as possible about senders￿types. In this case truthtelling incentives might be negative as they
reduce learning about a sender￿ s type.
A further e⁄ect arises when the decision maker has to choose between relying on communication
or on delegation before knowing the realization of ￿rst period importance: now, the distribution of
￿rst period importance for senders plays a role. Intuitively, the distribution of period importance
for senders attributes di⁄erent weights to regions where there is truthtelling under delegation and
no truthtelling under communication, etc. In order to provide further results it is necessary to
make speci￿c assumptions on the distribution of period importance for the decision maker and
that for senders. However, overall, these results indicate that the optimality of delegation as
opposed to communication essentially depends upon the importance of the decision for senders.
186 Promoting a junior
Previous discussion showed that the decision maker can raise truthtelling incentives by delegating
decision powers to a sender elected as ￿more in￿ uential￿ . Delegation is bene￿cial because it
protects in￿ uence while maintaining discipline. The more the in￿ uential sender fears the opponent
is honest, the more discipline there will be. It is thus interesting to extend the model and analyze
a situation in which one sender already has an established reputation (the senior), while the other
is promising, but still has to prove his qualities (the junior). This is modelled by assuming that
one sender has a larger prior probability of being honest, although both have enough reputation
to ensure truthtelling occurs in equilibrium. Suppose, without loss of generality, that player s (the
senior) is more likely to be honest ex ante. Thus the lost reputation e⁄ect will be stronger if player
j (the junior) is chosen as the in￿ uential sender. The decision maker faces an interesting trade
o⁄: on the one hand, delegating power to the player with the more established reputation yields
a larger probability to get truthful reporting in both periods because it is more likely that he is
honest; on the other hand, a biased sender has stronger incentives to report the truth, the higher
the reputation of the opponent. This is reminiscent of the result in the career concerns literature
that once a player￿ s reputation is more established its incentivizing role fades out. However, in
this model, the intuition is very di⁄erent as it is rather the reputation of the opponent that acts
as an incentive mechanism. This can be veri￿ed by inspecting the condition for truthtelling for
biased senders, under delegation. This is
B <




if the senior is delegated powers, p￿i = pj; while if the junior is delegated decision powers, p￿i = ps
and it is clear that if ps > pj; player j has stronger incentives to report the truth in the ￿rst period
than player s. The choice between a junior and a senior trades o⁄ a larger chance that a biased
in￿ uential sender reports the truth in the ￿rst period, against a lower chance that the in￿ uential
sender is honest. Therefore, organizations can decide to transfer powers from a senior to a junior
as a function of the relative importance of period decisions. A junior has stronger incentives
to behave in the ￿rst period because he has more to lose by misbehaving in early periods. In
fact in this case, if the senior is appointed in the second period, it is likely he will in￿ uence
decision-making against the preferences of a biased junior.
7 Competition among many senders
All the results so far rest on the assumption that the decision maker does not interact with more
than two senders. This implies that each sender can be pivotal for the decision at least if the true
state is di⁄erent from the unbiased state. On the contrary, if there are at least three senders, all
19with the same reputation, there will trivially be truthtelling under communication, if, as assumed
in the model so far, the decision maker cannot adjust the intensity of the action as a function of
the breadth of the ￿consensus￿ , or as a function of the probability the message is correct. Notice
that this would be true even in a static game. In that case, there would not be any truthtelling
equilibrium with two senders, while there could be a truthtelling equilibrium when at least three
senders report information. To see what happens if more than two senders report information and
the decision maker can adjust the intensity of the decision, suppose there are 3 senders, assume
the probability p is large enough so as to sustain information transmission in equilibrium, and
focus attention on the last period. It can be easily shown that the probability that, say, L is the
true state, is larger upon observing three agreeing messages suggesting the true state is L; than
upon observing two senders reporting state L and one sender reporting state R. If the decision
maker can adjust the intensity of the action she will be more willing to take an action closer to
the true state, the larger is the majority. Then, it is reasonable to think that the decision maker
will be willing to put more resources on decision L in the ￿rst case, than in the second.
Thus, from now on, I assume the decision maker can adjust the intensity of the decision as
a function of the breadth of the consensus among senders. In particular, assuming there are n
senders, the decision maker adjusts the intensity of the action so that the payo⁄ will be An and




2 +1; if there are n
2 + 1 concordant messages and
therefore a majority of one or two messages, depending upon whether n is odd or even. However,
in a truthtelling equilibrium, the decision maker knows that senders are reporting the truth. In
such a case, she implements the decision suggested by all senders with the maximal intensity, and
I denote payo⁄s as Afull;Bfull: Observing at least one con￿ icting message is an out of equilibrium
event. I assume that in such a case the decision maker adjusts decision intensity as explained
above, using the fact that there is a majority of n concordant messages (for a whole of n + 1
senders).22
As in the two senders model, there are not equilibria where, in case of disagreement, the
decision maker always implements the suggestion of a given sender. If there is no consensus, but
at least one of the con￿ icting messages suggests the unbiased state, then the latter is implemented,
while if there are con￿ icting messages suggesting actions L and R and there is no majority, the
decision maker randomizes. Consider the case of a left-biased sender observing the true state
is R: Suppose also that there are n + 1 senders, with n even.23 I denote with l the number of
left-biased senders, with r that of right-biased and with h that of honest senders. Then in a pure
strategies truthtelling equilibrium, payo⁄s under communication from reporting the truth and
22This corresponds to taking an expectation about the likelihood the state reported by the majority is the true
state.
23The case n odd is essentially analogous.


































































































































































































The expressions follow the same reasoning as in the two senders case and by noting that senders are
￿drawn￿from a trinomial distribution, with parameters n; p;
1￿p
2 . A more thorough explanation
for these equations is provided in the appendix. The main e⁄ects of competition highlighted in
the two senders version of the model are still at work. There is a reduced future in￿ uence e⁄ect,
as the sender does not know whether he will be able to in￿ uence next period decision. In fact,
there can be a majority of right-biased senders, or the true state can be di⁄erent from L and there
21can be a majority of honest senders. On the other hand, there is a lost reputation e⁄ect, as next
period decision could be in￿ uenced by right-biased senders, or the true state might be di⁄erent
from L and there can be a majority of honest senders. Both e⁄ects are further a⁄ected by the
adjustment in action intensity: if all senders are left-biased, the intensity will be Bn+1; if there is
one right-biased, the intensity will be Bn; etc. Similarly, the reduced current in￿ uence e⁄ect now
depends upon the ability of the sender to a⁄ect the intensity of the decision. There is truthtelling





































































































Now, it can be seen that competition induces a further ￿consensus￿e⁄ect: if the sender lies in
the current period, he changes the decision from Bfull to Bn: Similarly, keeping a reputation
allows the intensity of the decision to be increased when this is favorable, and to decrease it
when it is unfavorable. Thus, the choice between giving up own reputation and giving up current
period payo⁄ will depend upon the interplay of the reduced in￿ uence, discipline and consensus
e⁄ects. The latter contributes to determine both the magnitude of the opportunity cost of keeping
own reputation and the strength of the future bene￿t of keeping own reputation. In fact, if the
di⁄erence (Bfull ￿ Bn) is very small, the sender will not be able to modify much the intensity of
the decision in the current period. The bene￿t of keeping own reputation will depend upon the
likelihood next period decision accords to the preferences of the sender. This crucially depends
upon the probability distribution of types and upon the strength of the change in intensity of
the action when the majority gets larger. The latter creates a new dimension to be analyzed
also when discussing delegation of authority: the decision maker might delegate decision powers,
while constraining the ability to set decision intensity. Denoting the latter as Bd; the payo⁄ of a













This follows as it is assumed the proportion of honest, left-biased and right-biased is the same in
the sample of n senders. Then, there is truthtelling as long as
B
d <




Whether delegation or communication leads to stronger truthtelling incentives depends upon the
parameters of the problem, and it is necessary to impose more structure on the model to get
a precise threshold.24 However, it is clear that in principle either organizational form could be
superior, and the main insight of the two senders model carry forward to the n senders case
extended to the possibility that the decision maker adjusts the intensity of the decision. This is
formalized in the following
Proposition 7 All e⁄ects highlighted in the two senders case are still present if n senders compete
for in￿uence and the decision maker can adjust the intensity of the decision.
Proof. See the appendix.
8 Discussion
This section discusses the role of the main assumptions, the modelling strategy, and applications
of the model.
8.1 Assumptions and modelling strategy
The model captures, in a parsimonious way, the e⁄ects of introducing competition in a dynamic
game of information transmission when the bias of senders is not known. The set up of the model
is quite standard, and alternative ways to model the bias of senders (such as in Sobel 1985, or in
Benabou and Laroque 1992) would not alter the main results.
The assumption that one action is not preferred by any biased type plays a role. In this
(relatively) simple model, without an unbiased action and without the possibility for the decision
maker to adjust the intensity of the action, the reduced current and future in￿ uence and the lost
reputation e⁄ects would exactly compensate each other. However, this is a special feature of the
24For example, it is necessary to establish how the di⁄erence Bn ￿ Bn￿1 evolves as n changes, as well as how
large this is in comparison with Bd:
23simple set-up used here. On the other hand, this assumption makes communication with multiple
senders naturally more attractive, as biased senders would always report information truthfully
when observing the state corresponding to the unbiased action.
An important element that deserves further discussion is that senders observe perfectly the
state of the world. This impacts on the dynamics of reputation: once a sender makes a mistake
his reputation is gone. If he observed the state imperfectly, a mistake could be attributed to him
receiving a wrong message, rather than to opportunistic behavior. In that case, reputation would
evolve more realistically over time as, for example, in Benabou and Laroque (1992). Furthermore,
the assumption reduces the scope for information aggregation: if the state of the world was
observed noisily, aggregating the messages of multiple senders would increase the precision of the
information received, even if some senders reported information strategically. This is clearly an
important element, but its inclusion would complicate substantially the analysis preventing a clear
investigation of the other e⁄ects generated by competition (reduced in￿ uence and lost reputation
e⁄ect).
8.2 Applications
The model lends itself to the analysis of situations characterized by the presence of experts who
can provide information relevant for sound decision-making and who are interested in in￿ uencing
the decision-making process. The leading application is the analysis of the interaction among
managers competing for corporate resources. Managers (the experts) observe information relevant
to determining the most appropriate decision to maximize ￿rm pro￿ts, or ￿nancial ratios, or other
measures of performance. For example one manager can be very knowledgeable about domestic
operations while another manager about overseas operations. The state of the world can be the
state of the economy: if the domestic economy is very strong, the central management of the
￿rm (the decision maker) should allocate more resources to the domestic operations department,
but not if the overseas economy is growing strongly. If global markets are stagnating, the ￿rm
should allocate resources neither to domestic, nor to overseas operations. Biased managers prefer
resources to be allocated in the area in which they are stronger so that they are more likely to
impress the central management, irrespective of the state of the economy. The central management
observes whether the information provided was correct, and evaluates the reliability of managers
for future decisions. The central management can choose to collect information from managers
and decide on the appropriate corporate strategy, or can delegate decisions to one of the managers,
say, the head of domestic operations. The results of the paper show that delegation can improve
the quality of the decision-making process.
Another interesting application is the analysis of the ￿nancing of a new technology by govern-
mental agencies. Suppose one team of scientists is working to improve the technology to derive
fuel from ethanol, while another team is working on wind energy. The government might be in-
24terested in allocating scarce funds to the project which is most likely to succeed. The government
can hire di⁄erent experts from the academia to assess the relative merits of the two and evaluate
the one that deserves funds the most. However, some experts could be captured by agricultural
lobbies supporting ethanol as it would boost the value of corn crops, while other experts could
be captured by corporations producing components for wind farms. The paper shows the relative
bene￿ts of consulting multiple experts as opposed to relying only on one and shows conditions
under which the latter can be preferable.
The results of the paper can also be applied to the investigation of other important real world
interactions such as politicians competing to be elected, lobbies trying to in￿ uence politicians,
￿nancial analysts providing information to investors, investment banks providing advice to cus-
tomers.
9 Conclusion
This paper analyzed truthtelling incentives of experts competing for in￿ uence. On the one hand
competition for in￿ uence determines a ￿reduced in￿ uence￿e⁄ect both in the current and in the
future period: a biased sender knows he is less likely to in￿ uence future decisions, so that he is
less willing to sacri￿ce current payo⁄s to build a reputation for providing sound advice; however
a biased sender is not able to enjoy the full value of a current deviation, thus the opportunity cost
of maintaining a reputation is reduced. On the other hand, competition for in￿ uence determines
a lost reputation e⁄ect: biased senders fear that if they deplete their reputation, other senders
will in￿ uence future decisions. Finally, competition allows the decision maker to aggregate more
information and this may enable, in some circumstances, the decision maker to distinguish cor-
rect reports from wrong reports. The interplay among these e⁄ects generates interesting results
and o⁄ers novel insights for organizational design. The ￿rst is that the decision-making process
can be less prone to errors if only one sender reports information, as competition may harm
decision-making. The second result is that the quality of decision-making can be improved if
one sender is delegated authority to make decisions, becoming an ￿in￿ uential sender￿ . The third
is that decision-making could be further improved if the decision maker biases the competition
for in￿ uence: this shows favoritism can arise as an optimal way to foster truthtelling incentives.
Thus, this paper provides a new theory for the allocation of authority and for the use of favoritism
in organizations: they arise endogenously as rational organizational responses to the incentives
created by competition to in￿ uence decision-making. The leading application of these results is
the analysis of resources allocation among divisions within an organization, but the insights of
the model can be applied to investigate a variety of economic interactions: politicians competing
to be elected, lobbies willing to in￿ uence politicians, ￿nancial analysts providing information to
investors, investment banks providing advice to corporate clients.
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Appendix - Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
Part 1: In the last period the sender has no reputational concerns. By reporting his preferred
decision he can enjoy a positive payo⁄, while his payo⁄ is non-positive if he does not report his
preferred decision. When he does not have enough credibility, he randomizes and the decision
maker puts zero weight on the message provided.
Part 2: this is obvious as by reporting the true state of the world he enjoys a current gain
without incurring any loss in reputation.25
Part 3: state C is less likely than the other two states when ￿ > 1
3: Any strategy that attaches
positive weight to this state, when the decision maker is uninformed, is strictly dominated by a
strategy that randomizes between states L and R: Such strategy yields an expected payo⁄of zero.





2 (￿(1￿2￿))] > 0; which holds if p2 > 1￿2￿
2(1￿￿): This follows because
the sender is honest with probability p2 and then reports the truth. With probability
1￿p
2 he is
left-biased, and with probability ￿ the true state is L; so he is reporting the truth, while with
probability (1 ￿ 2￿) + ￿ the state is either C, or R; and the left-biased sender lies. The same
reasoning describes the behavior of a right-biased sender. In period 1 the sender is able to credibly









1))]g > 0: In order to ensure the existence of truthtelling equilibria in pure strategies, it is
necessary that p > 1￿2￿
2(1￿￿). In fact, in such a case, both types of biased senders report the truth in
the ￿rst period setting qs
1 = zs
1 = 1, so that p2 = p and information can be credibly transmitted
if and only if p2 > 1￿2￿
2(1￿￿):
Proof of Lemma 2
Part 1: This follows from the fact that when senders have enough credibility, the expected
payo⁄ from following their advice is larger than that from making decisions without information.
25Furthermore, it never pays to lie by falsely reporting the true state is the unbiased state C. This follows
because the sender would su⁄er both a current period loss, and a reputational loss. The latter is implied by the
assumptions that the true state is observed perfectly. Otherwise, it could happen that a biased sender lied in order
to gain a reputation for being unbiased. This mechanism would be similar to that unveiled in Morris (2001).
27Thus the decision d coincides either with mi or with m￿i: Moreover, when this is true, as the
decision maker has a linear payo⁄ function, it is optimal to set ￿i;mi;m￿i + ￿￿i;mi;m￿i = 1:
Part 2: The proof is in the text.
Proof of Lemma 3












In fact, con￿ icting messages L and R can occur when the decision maker faces an honest sender
and a biased sender (this occurs with probability 4p
1￿p
2 ; or when both sender are biased, but one
is left-biased and the other right-biased (this occurs with probability 2(
1￿p
2 )2): The decision maker
might use a strategy that implements action k 2 fL;C;Rg when observing disagreeing messages
L and R: In such a case, suppose the true state is L and the strategy is ￿implement state R when
messages disagree￿ : a left-biased sender will report the truth because he has no way to in￿ uence
the decision maker. A right-biased sender, on the contrary, can decide to ensure getting the
current period payo⁄by lying. When observing con￿ icting messages L and R; the decision maker
knows the true state is L and will want to deviate from the proposed strategy. The same applies
to strategies prescribing to choose C when observing messages L and R: The decision maker gets
￿(1 ￿ 2￿)
(1￿p)2
2 A by randomizing while she gets 4p
1￿p
2 (￿A) + 2
(1￿p)2
4 (1 ￿ 4￿)A by choosing C:
The latter follows because if there is at least one honest sender, and messages are L and R; by
choosing decision C, the decision maker surely implements a wrong action. If both senders are
biased, and messages are con￿ icting, expected payo⁄by choosing action C is (1￿2￿)A￿2￿A: It
can be seen that ￿(1 ￿ 2￿)
(1￿p)2




2 (1 ￿ 4￿)A is always veri￿ed when there
is information transmission (i.e. p > 1￿2￿
2(1￿￿)): It can be veri￿ed that this is also true for the lowest
prior probability consistent with the existence of a mixed strategy equilibrium. With the same
reasoning it is possible to rule out mixed strategies that implement action k with asymmetric
probabilities.
Part 2: suppose not and suppose that when there is disagreement the action of sender i is
implemented. This cannot be true if sender i suggests action L and sender ￿i suggests action C.
In general, sender ￿i will prefer to tell the truth as she will not be able to in￿ uence the current
decision, but then, in case of disagreement, the decision maker knows sender i is lying and she
will prefer not to abide by the proposed equilibrium strategy.
Proof of Proposition 1
The ￿rst part was proved in Lemma 1, part 2. For the second part, the payo⁄ of a biased
sender, when the true state is di⁄erent from the one he prefers, is given by
VT = ￿B + ￿E(B)
28if he tells the truth in the ￿rst period, and
VL = B
if he lies in the ￿rst period. The necessary condition for a pure strategy equilibrium with




The model has a continuum of mixed strategy equilibria. When the true state is C; both a
left and a right-biased senders lie. As payo⁄s are the same, the equilibrium is symmetric and
qC = zC = q; therefore, p2 =
p
p + (1 ￿ p)q
. The posterior probability that an agent is honest
should be high enough in the second period, in particular p2 =
p





is veri￿ed as long as q <
p
(1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ 2￿)
which is a necessary condition for a mixed strategy











is veri￿ed as long as q <
p(3 ￿ 2￿) ￿ (1 ￿ 2￿)
(1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ 2￿)
: Such mixed strategy
equilibria occur over a set of measure zero. In fact, it is a measure zero event that parameters are




Proof of Proposition 2
The ￿rst part was proved in Lemma 1, part 2. The second part regarding the behavior of a
biased sender when the true state is state C was proved in Lemma 2. The rest of the second part
can be proved as follows: in a pure strategy equilibrium, by de￿nition, qR
i;1 = qR
￿i = 1: Also, as
proved by Lemma 3, ￿i;mi;m￿i = ￿￿i;mi;m￿i = 1
2 where mi;m￿i = L;R: The proof of the second
part follows by comparing payo⁄s from lying and telling the truth and imposing the condition
VT > VL. Now consider mixed strategy equilibria. When the sender is left-biased, he is willing to
randomize if the true state in the ￿rst period is R; otherwise when the true state is C, or L; there
is truthtelling in pure strategies. Then qR
￿i has to be such that V i
T = V i
L, and to ease notation,
drop the dependence of q on the observed state and on the time period. Then, by rearranging























































































Plugging the equilibrium values of ￿i;mi;m￿i :
q￿i =
2[￿E(B)(1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)p) ￿ B]
￿E(B)(1 ￿ p)
the equilibrium is clearly symmetric and therefore q￿i = qi = q: In order for this to be an
equilibrium, two additional conditions have to be met. Firstly, q has to be a well de￿ned
probability, hence 0 < q < 1; secondly p2 >
1 ￿ 2￿
2(1 ￿ ￿)
; i.e., second period reputation must












p(3 ￿ 2￿) ￿ (1 ￿ 2￿)
(1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ 2￿)
: For this to hold, it must be that
p(3 ￿ 2￿) ￿ (1 ￿ 2￿)











). The fact that the symmet-
ric mixed strategy equilibrium is unique follows by the non-existence of asymmetric equilibria,












Proof of Proposition 3
When the true state is C, the ￿unbiased￿state, there is always truthtelling with two senders,
while there is truthtelling with one sender only if period importance is not too large. When the















￿ ￿)] ￿ B
￿
2
Truthtelling in pure strategies occurs over a set of parameters of larger measure when there is






[1 ￿ p(1 ￿ 2￿)]
which is always veri￿ed as ￿ < 1
2. There is truthtelling in mixed strategies with two senders if
and only if






> ￿E(B)[1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)p]




Therefore there can be parameter values for which there is truthtelling in pure strategies with one
sender and truthtelling in mixed strategies with two senders and, if the probability the opponent
is honest is large enough, there can even be a region of parameters such that there is truthtelling
in pure strategies with one sender and no truthtelling with two senders.
Proof of Proposition 4
It can be seen that delegation generates stronger truthtelling incentives than communication
in both the one and the two senders cases. In fact, it is easy to see that








[1 ￿ p(1 ￿ 2￿)]
Moreover,
￿E(B)[1 + p(1 ￿ 2￿)]
2
> ￿E(B)[1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)p]
if and only if p > 1
3￿4￿ so that, when the true state in the ￿rst period is di⁄erent from state C, and
the probability the opponent is honest is relatively large there are values of period importance for
which there is truthtelling in pure strategies under delegation and not even truthtelling in mixed
strategies under communication.
Proof of Proposition 5
I ￿rstly derive conditions sustaining truthtelling for the in￿ uential and for the non-in￿ uential
31sender. I assume sender i is left-biased. When the true state is L he trivially reports the truth.
When the true state is not L; it is important to distinguish the case when the true state is C, from
that when the true state is R: In fact, in the latter case, a right-biased opponent surely reports
the truth, while, if the true state is C, a right-biased sender might prefer to lie. Therefore, the






















































































when the true state is R. When the true state is C, the right-biased sender reports the truth with
probability z; and reports his preferred state otherwise. Therefore, he retains his credibility with
probability z: On the contrary, when the true state is R; a right-biased sender always reports the
truth and retains his credibility. The intuition for these equations is essentially analogous to that
for equations 1 and 2.
A biased non-in￿ uential sender always lies in a truthtelling equilibrium, as he will not have any
chance to in￿ uence future decisions, unless the true state coincides with his preferences. Thus,
when the true state is C biased non-in￿ uential senders lie (and q = z = 0) and a left-biased
in￿ uential sender reports the truth in the ￿rst period if and only if
B <
￿E(B)[1 + (1 ￿ 2￿)p]
2￿i
1
When the true state is R and the in￿ uential sender reports the truth, a right-biased non-in￿ uential
sender reports the truth (so that z = 1); while a left-biased non-in￿ uential sender lies (so that
q = 0) and a left-biased in￿ uential sender reports the truth if and only if
B <




If the in￿ uential sender lies, a biased non-in￿ uential sender might prefer to report the truth.
32Again it is important to distinguish the case when the true state is C from the case when the true
state is R: In the former situation, both a left and a right-biased non-in￿ uential senders behave
analogously. Expected payo⁄s for such senders are given by
V
￿i
T (C) = ￿￿
i
1Bp ￿ (1 ￿ ￿
i
1)B + ￿E(B)(1 ￿ p) ￿ (1 ￿ 2￿)p￿E(B)
V
￿i
L (C) = ￿￿
i
1Bp + (1 ￿ ￿
i
1)B ￿ (1 ￿ 2￿)p￿E(B)




2 = (1 ￿ p) the in￿ uential
sender is either left, or right-biased, and lies in the ￿rst period, so that the non-in￿ uential sender
can in￿ uence second period decision. On the contrary, with probability p; the in￿ uential sender
is honest, reports the truth in the ￿rst period and in￿ uences second period decision leading to
an expected payo⁄ of ￿(1 ￿ 2￿)p￿E(B): The payo⁄ from lying can be understood analogously.





If the true state is R a right-biased sender always reports the truth, while a left-biased sender has
the following expected payo⁄ functions:
V
￿i
T (R) = ￿￿
i











L (R) = ￿￿
i
1Bp + (1 ￿ ￿
i









According to the degree of favoritism (the parameter ￿i
1); there can exist two equilibria. When
the true state is C, a biased in￿ uential sender reports the truth in the ￿rst period as long as
B <
￿E(B)[1 + (1 ￿ 2￿)p]
2￿i
1





￿E(B)[1 + (1 ￿ 2￿)p]
2￿i
1




1 + p ￿ 2￿p
2(1 ￿ ￿p)
33When this condition is not veri￿ed, in equilibrium the biased in￿ uential sender reports the truth
as long as
B <
￿E(B)[1 + (1 ￿ 2￿)p]
2￿i
1
and lies otherwise, while biased non-in￿ uential senders lie when
B <
￿E(B)[1 + (1 ￿ 2￿)p]
2￿i
1
and report the truth for







Similarly, when the true state is R; there exists an equilibrium where the in￿ uential sender reports
the truth as long as
B <


















3 + (1 ￿ 4￿)p
4(1 ￿ ￿p)
When this condition is not satis￿ed, in equilibrium the biased in￿ uential sender reports the truth
as long as
B <




and lies otherwise. A left-biased non-in￿ uential sender lies when
B <




and reports the truth for
3 + (1 ￿ 4￿)p
4￿i
1




A biased in￿ uential sender has stronger incentives to report the truth than under either delegation
or communication. In fact,









[1 ￿ p(1 ￿ 2￿)]
34as ￿i
1 ￿ 1; and









[1 ￿ p(1 ￿ 2￿)]
Moreover, the non-in￿ uential sender reports the truth if he is honest, and biased non-in￿ uential
senders may report the truth according to the whether the state of the world coincides with their
preferences and to the degree of favoritism.
Proof of Proposition 6
The proposition can be proved by comparing payo⁄s for the decision maker for di⁄erent real-
izations of period importance.
1. If B 2 [B;B￿
2]; there is truthtelling in pure strategies both under communication and under




2[A + ￿E(A)] + 4p
(1 ￿ p)
2




2[4A ￿ 2(1 ￿ 2￿)￿E(A))]




2[A + ￿E(A)] + 2p
(1 ￿ p)
2
[A + ￿E(A)] + 2p
(1 ￿ p)
2





2[4A ￿ 4(1 ￿ 2￿)￿E(A))]
The intuition for these expressions is as follows: with probability p2 both senders are honest and
report the truth no matter the state and period importance. Then, the decision maker implements
the correct decision ensuring a payo⁄ of A in the ￿rst period, and an expected payo⁄ of ￿E(A)
in the second. With probability p
1￿p
2 ; one sender is honest, and the other is biased and as the
latter can be left or right-biased, the total number of such cases is four. Period importance
is low enough so that there is truthtelling in pure strategies in the ￿rst period, and payo⁄ is
A both under delegation and under communication. In the latter case expected second period
payo⁄ is (1 ￿ ￿)￿E(A); because with probability (1 ￿ 2￿) the true state is C, and the decision
maker observes a C message from the honest sender and a non C message from the biased sender,
and learns the true state is C. With probability ￿ the true state accords with the preferences
of the biased sender and the decision maker observes two agreeing messages and implements
the correct decision. Finally, with probability ￿ the true state is opposed to the preferences
of the biased sender and the decision maker observes con￿ icting messages and randomizes, so
that expected payo⁄ is zero. Under delegation, if the honest sender is delegated decision powers,
second period decision is made correctly, otherwise, it is correct only when the true state is the
one preferred by the biased sender, and this happens with probability ￿: In the other cases, the
biased sender implements a wrong decision yielding an expected payo⁄ of ￿￿E(A): Finally, with
35probability (
1￿p
2 )2 both senders are biased, either left or right. They report the truth in the
￿rst period as period importance is lower than B￿
2; while they lie in the second period. Under
communication, there can be 2 cases: both senders have the same bias, or they have opposed
biases. In the latter case, which occurs with probability 2(
1￿p
2 )2; the decision maker observes
con￿ icting messages and randomizes. In the former case, which occurs with probability 2(
1￿p
2 )2;
the decision maker observes agreeing messages and implements the decision preferred by senders.
That is correct with probability ￿ and wrong with probability (1 ￿ ￿): Under delegation the





2 (1 ￿ 2￿)￿E(A) ￿ 2(
1￿p
2 )2(1 ￿ 2￿) < 0; so that communication leads to a
larger payo⁄ for the decision maker.
2. If B 2 [B￿
2;minfBmix
2 ;Bdelg] there is truthtelling in pure strategies under delegation, and
truthtelling in mixed strategies under communication, unless the true state is zero. Payo⁄s for




2[A + ￿E(A)] + 4p
(1 ￿ p)
2
f(1 ￿ ￿)[A + (1 ￿ ￿)￿E(A)] + ￿[q[A + (1 ￿ ￿)￿E(A)] +




2f2[(1 ￿ ￿)(A ￿ (1 ￿ 2￿)￿E(A)) + ￿((q
2(A ￿ (1 ￿ 2￿)￿E(A)) +
2q(1 ￿ q)(￿(1 ￿ 2￿)￿E(A)) + (1 ￿ q)
2(￿A))] +




2[A + ￿E(A)] + 2p
(1 ￿ p)
2
[A + ￿E(A)] + 2p
(1 ￿ p)
2





2[4A ￿ 4(1 ￿ 2￿)￿E(A))]


















[8￿A(1 ￿ q) ￿ (8p(1 ￿ 2￿ + ￿
2(1 ￿ q) + 2(1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ 2￿)(1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ q
2)))￿E(A)]
In order to investigate the sign of this expression, it is necessary to plug q￿ in. However, q￿ is
function of B and ￿E(B); and it is necessary to make assumptions about the correlation between
B and A:
3. When p > 1
3￿4￿ and B 2 [Bmix;Bdel] there is truthtelling under delegation, and no





2[A + ￿E(A)] + 4p
(1 ￿ p)
2









2[A + ￿E(A)] + 2p
(1 ￿ p)
2
[A + ￿E(A)] + 2p
(1 ￿ p)
2





2[4A ￿ 4(1 ￿ 2￿)￿E(A))]














2(8￿A ￿ 2(1 ￿ 2￿)(1 ￿ ￿)￿E(A))
it can be seen that this expression is positive as long as
A > ￿E(A)
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ 2￿ + 2￿p)
4￿
and this can occur over the feasible set for parameters.
4. When p < 1
3￿4￿ and B 2 [Bdel;Bmix] there is truthtelling in mixed strategies under




2[A + ￿E(A)] + 4p
(1 ￿ p)
2
f(1 ￿ ￿)[A + (1 ￿ ￿)￿E(A)] + ￿[q[A + (1 ￿ ￿)￿E(A)] +




2f2[(1 ￿ ￿)(A ￿ (1 ￿ 2￿)￿E(A)) + ￿((q
2(A ￿ (1 ￿ 2￿)￿E(A)) +
2q(1 ￿ q)(￿(1 ￿ 2￿)￿E(A)) + (1 ￿ q)
2(￿A))] +




2[A + ￿E(A)] + 2p
(1 ￿ p)
2
[A + ￿E(A)] + 2p
(1 ￿ p)
2





2[4(1 ￿ ￿)(￿A ￿ (1 ￿ 2￿)￿E(A)) + 4￿(A ￿ (1 ￿ 2￿)￿E(A))]

















[￿8(1 ￿ 2￿ + ￿q)A + 8p(￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ q))￿E(A)￿
2(1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ 2￿)(1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ q
2))￿E(A)]
Again, in order to check the sign of this expression it is necessary to plug in for q and this requires
making speci￿c assumptions about the correlation between A and B:
5. Finally, if B 2 [maxfBdel;Bmixg;B] biased senders have no incentives for truthtelling
neither under delegation, nor under communication unless the state is zero. Payo⁄s for the
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(1 ￿ p)
2








2[A + ￿E(A)] + 2p
(1 ￿ p)
2
[A + ￿E(A)] + 2p
(1 ￿ p)
2





2[4(1 ￿ ￿)(￿A ￿ (1 ￿ 2￿)￿E(A)) + 4￿(A ￿ (1 ￿ 2￿)￿E(A))]














This expression is positive as long as
A < ￿E(A)
[2￿(1 + p) ￿ (1 ￿ p)](1 ￿ ￿)
8p(1 ￿ 2￿)
and this can occur over the feasible set for parameters.
Proof of Proposition 7




38while that from lying is
VL = B
full
The gain from lying in the current period is 2Bfull; the expected payo⁄ from exerting in￿ uence
in the future is ￿E(B1); the expected future payo⁄ if own reputation is depleted is zero.









































































































Firstly, it should be noticed that when the true state is C; it is su¢ cient one honest sender to
in￿ uence the decision away from a left-biased sender preferences. Furthermore, the decision goes
against the interests of a left-biased sender when the true state is R and there is not a majority
of left-biased senders, when the true state is one and there is a majority of left-biased senders, or
when the true state is C and there are no honest senders and a majority of right-biased senders.
This shows the sender will not be able to cash in the bene￿t of keeping own reputation with
probability one, although it is not possible to directly compare those bene￿ts with the payo⁄ in
the one sender case because the expected intensity of the action is typically di⁄erent from the
intensity corresponding to that in the one sender case (which would correspond to a majority of
39one sender). However, again, if the intensity of the action does not increase too much when the
consensus increases by n to n + 1, future in￿ uence is reduced under competition.
A bene￿t of keeping own reputation is the ability to in￿ uence next period decision towards
own interests by changing the majority, so that a favorable decision will be ￿more favorable￿and
an unfavorable decision will be dampened. When own reputation is lost, in the one sender case































































































and again the decision goes against a left-biased sender preferences in the same situations as
above. An additional di⁄erence is that now n is even, so having lost own reputation prevents the






























































































and it a⁄ects truthtelling incentives as in the two senders game.
Illustration of Equations 3 and 4.
If the sender reports the truth in a truthtelling equilibrium, current period payo⁄is ￿Bn+1 as
all n + 1 senders are reporting the same message. Then in the second period the true state is L
with probability ￿: There will be a majority of messages suggesting state L as long as there are
no more than n















With probability (1 ￿ 2￿) the true state is C: If there is at least an honest sender, he reports
the truth and the decision maker knows the true state is C and sets the intensity to the max-
imum, denoted as Bfull: If there is no honest sender, the decision depends upon whether the



















(￿E(Bn￿r); because there is a majority of left-biased

















(￿E(Br) because there is a majority of right-










2 )l+r there is a majority of left-biased senders










2 )l+r there is a majority either of unbiased, or of right-
biased senders, and decision R is implemented with intensity ￿E(Bn￿l): The payo⁄ from lying
can be understood analogously. It should be noticed that when sender i lies, the total num-
ber of credible senders in the second period is n: Then, if the true state of the world in the
second period is L; (this occurs with probability (1 ￿ 2￿); decision L is implemented when










2 )l+r: It can be seen that when there are n
2 left-biased or
unbiased senders, and n
2 right-biased senders, the decision maker observes exactly the same num-
ber of con￿ icting messages and she randomizes, while, if the (n + 1)th sender reported the truth
in the ￿rst period, he could be pivotal and create a majority of messages suggesting decision L:
The other terms can now be easily understood, and I omit a detailed explanation.
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